Neuroscientific evidence undermines the cognitivist account of moral truth and specifically Kantians like Korsgaard. **Schroeder 10** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

What, then, is left? **The cognitivist holds** the view **that moral motivation begins with** occurrent **belief**. In particular, it begins with beliefs **about what** actions **would be right.** The cognitivist holds that, at least in cases of morally worthy action, such beliefs lead to motivation to perform those actions, quite independently of any antecedent desires. The cognitivist is happy to call this motivational state ‘‘a desire,’’ but thinks of it as entirely dependent upon the moral belief that created it. The cognitivist position has recognizable afﬁnities to familiar positions in the philosophical literature (e.g. **Korsgaard**, 1994; McDowell, 1998: ch. 4; Smith, 1994). These philosophers, of course, hold that much more is going on in the mind of a morally worthy agent than the simple picture painted by our cognitivist. They generally **agree[s]**, however, **that moral**ly worthy **action is not dependent** up**on** antecedent **desires, but** stems in the ﬁrst instance from one’s **judgments.** On the cognitivist’s view, Jen’s desires are not irrelevant to her action, but they are not the initiating engines of her action either. Instead, her desires are mere data that she considers (perhaps) in coming to be motivated. Given what is available to her, perhaps she comes to believe that it would be right to give the homeless man money, and it never occurs to her to even consider her desires. This consideration of the rightness of giving money to the homeless man motivates Jen to give him some money, and she does. Because she is moved by the right sort of belief, her action has moral worth.

[…]

Of our four caricature theorists, it is obviously **our cognitivist** who **is most likely to have difﬁculties accommodating the neuroscientiﬁc evidence.** Although it was pointed out earlier that the theoretical possibility exists that moral cognition can lead directly to moral motivation independently of the reward system (and so independently of desire), this theoretical possibility proves to be problematic upon closer inspection. We begin with evidence from Parkinson disease. As will be familiar to many, Parkinson disease is a disorder that results in a number of effects, including tremor, difﬁculty in initiating movement, and (if taken to its limit) total paralysis. Parkinson disease is caused by the death of the dopamine-producing cells of the substantia nigra pars compacta (the SNpc in Figure 3.1), the very cells that make up the reward system’s output to the motor basal ganglia. Thus, on the interpretation of the reward system advocated earlier, **Parkinson disease is a disorder in which intrinsic desires slowly lose their** capacity to causally inﬂuence **motivation.** As it turns out, **Parkinson** disease impairs or **prevents action** regardless of **whether the action is moral**ly worthy **or not,** regardless of whether it is intuitively desired or intuitively done out of duty, regardless of **whether the individual** trying to act **gives a law to herself. Thus Parkinson** disease **appears to show that intrinsic desires are necessary to** the production of **motivation** in normal human beings, and this would seem to put serious pressure on the cognitivist’s position. The cognitivist might allow that intrinsic desires must exist in order for motivation to be possible, but hold that intrinsic desires normally play no signiﬁcant role in producing motivation. After all, Parkinson disease shows that intrinsic desires are necessary for motivation, but it does not clearly reveal the role played by intrinsic desires in producing motivation when the desires exist. If sustainable, this would be just a minor concession, and so it is well worth investigating. What might motivation of the cognitivist’s sort look like, if desires play no substantive role in it? It was suggested in the previous section that it might look like motivation that stems directly from activity in the higher cognitive centers—like motivation that stems from choosing a law for one’s action, in other words. And it turns out that motivation derived from higher cognitive centers independently of desire is possible—but also that the only known model of it is pathological. It is the sort of motivation found in Tourette syndrome. Tourette syndrome is a disorder characterized by tics: eye blinks, shoulder jerks, barks, obscenities, profanities, and so on. Something like 70–90% of sufferers report that they often voluntarily produce their tics, because the effort of not ticcing is unpleasant and often doomed to failure in any case. But a typical sufferer from Tourette syndrome will also report that tics are quite capable of forcing themselves out regardless of how fiercely they are resisted. Tourette syndrome appears to be caused by a dysfunction in the motor basal ganglia, in which the motor basal ganglia inhibit most motor commands initiated by perceptual and higher cognitive centers, but not quite all. Some motor commands initiated by perceptual or higher cognitive centers get through in spite of the inhibition, and in spite of the fact that reward signals (intrinsic desires) have not released these inhibitions. A tic is the result (Schroeder, 2005). Thus direct causation of **motivation by higher cognition** via this pathway, quite independently of desire, **is the sort of thing that results in a Tourettic tic, but a Tourettic tic is anything but** the paradigm of **morally worthy action. This seems a very unpromising parallel** to be drawn **for** a **cognitivist** picture of **motivation.** There are other ways to investigate the biological plausibility of our cognitivist’s position as well. **If reason alone were responsible for moral motivation,** one would expect that **injuries that spare reason would also spare moral motivation, but** there are clinical **case studies** that **suggest otherwise.** Damage to the ventromedial (VM) region of prefrontal cortex (located in the OFC in Figure 3.1), a form of brain damage studied extensively by Damasio and colleagues (see, e.g., Damasio, 1994), impairs cognitive input to the reward system, and so alters the output of the reward system to the motor basal ganglia. Such damage seems to render subjects incapable of acting on their better judgments in certain cases—a finding that we think ought to capture the imagination of any moral psychologist. In a well-known non-moral experimental task, subjects with this sort of injury were asked to draw cards from any of four decks of cards. Each card was marked with a number indicating a number of dollars won or lost, and subjects were asked to draw as they liked from the four decks, attempting to maximize their winnings. Normal control subjects tended to draw at first from two of the decks, which quickly revealed themselves to have high-paying cards when drawn from. But those same decks also had high-costing cards in them, and normal subjects soon enough learned to stay away from these decks and shift to the other two decks, where returns were lower but penalties less punitive (Bechara et al., 1997). **Subjects with** VM **prefrontal injuries**—with injuries to structures that are crucial input to the reward system—started their play just as normal subjects did, but strongly tended not to switch to the safer decks, instead staying with the high-paying, high-costing decks until they ran out of money. Fascinatingly, these same subjects sometimes **reported being aware of** what **the better strategy** would be, **but** they nonetheless **failed to follow it** (Bechara et al., 2000). **This** sort of finding **should** once again **give our cognitivist pause**, for it suggests that, at least in non-moral contexts, **reason alone does not** suffice to **guide action independently of reward information**; it is reasonable to speculate that reason may fail to produce motivation in moral cases as well. Damasio himself interprets these findings as specifically vindicating the role of felt emotional responses in decision-making, a more personalist than instrumentalist conclusion. However, the precise interpretation of the mechanism by which VM prefrontal cortical injury leads to its own peculiar effects is not yet well understood. We return to a discussion of these people with VM damage after exploring the consequences for the cognitivist thesis of another population of people with disorders of moral motivation: psychopaths. Psychopaths are people who seem cognitively normal, but evince little remorse or guilt for morally wrong actions. Psychopaths are identified by scoring high on a standard psychopathy checklist (Hare, 1991), and seem to be deficient in two respects: (1) emotional dysfunction, and (2) antisocial behavior. **Psychopaths** seem able to **comprehend** social and **moral rules, and** they typically **do not** seem to **have impaired reasoning** abilities. (Recent studies suggest that limbic system damage is correlated with psychopathy, and this is consistent with the fact that psychopaths show diminished affective response to cues of suffering in others, but it does not suggest any particularly cognitive impairment [Kiehl, 2006; but see Maibom, 2005].) As a population apparently **capable of** making **moral judgments but not** at all **motivated by them, psychopaths present a**n obvious **challenge to the cognitivist.** However, research suggests that psychopaths’ moral cognition is deficient in at least the following respect: they show a diminished capacity to distinguish moral from conventional violations (Blair, 1995, 1997). For instance, children with psychopathic tendencies are more likely to judge moral violations as authority-dependent (so the morality of hitting another child in a classroom will be held to depend on whether or not the teacher permits it, rather than held to be independent of such rules, as it is by normally developing children). This deficit has led some to argue that psychopaths have impaired moral concepts (Nichols, 2004: 113). Although they are able to say whether an action is right or wrong, permitted or prohibited, philosophers such as these suggest that psychopaths merely mouth the words, or make moral judgments in the ‘‘inverted commas’’ sense: judgments of what is called ‘‘moral’’ by others. The ability of psychopaths to stand as counter-examples to cognitivism rests upon some argument to the effect that psychopaths really do make moral judgments. If psychopaths indeed lack moral concepts or moral knowledge, then their failure to act morally or to appear to lack motivation is no challenge to cognitivism, for it can plausibly be argued that to make moral judgments at all, one must have moral concepts and possess some modicum of moral knowledge (Kennett & Fine, 2007). However, if the ability to make the moral/conventional distinction is not required for moral concepts or moral knowledge, then psychopaths appear to be candidate counter-examples to our cognitivist (see, e.g., Kelly et al., 2007). Although some arguments have been offered to suggest that psychopaths have requisite abilities to make moral judgments (Roskies, 2007), these arguments remain indecisive. On our view, **it remains unclear whether psychopaths are competent moral judges.**

Abstract philosophical theorizing represents a privileged White position. Appeals to universal capital-T truth are both unnecessary for pragmatic political action and a proactive cause of policy paralysis. **Kratochwil 8** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Firstly, **a pragmatic approach does not begin with** objects or “things” (**ontology**), **or** with **reason** and method (epistemology), **but with** “**acting”** ( prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, **as historical beings** placed **in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act** and must do so always **under time pressures** and **in the face of incomplete information**. Precisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, **what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear** ex ante, **because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions**, **and** the multiple **possibilities are rife with** incentives for (**dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts** informing actors about the relevant features of the situation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. **Instead of relying on** certainty and **universal validity** gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to **detail**, **rather than** to **generality**, **matter**. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and usefulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since **acting in the social world** often **involves acting “for” someone,** special **responsibilities arise** that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since **we owe** special **care to those entrusted to us**, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, **we cannot** just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot ***refuse* to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient knowledge**, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sciences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

Ignore skepticism and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action. This also creates a reciprocal 1 to 1 burden structure, so it’s key to fairness.

Focus on concrete problems and solutions is the only meaningful form of philosophy. Ivory tower philosophy theorizes itself into irrelevance. **Edet 03**[[3]](#footnote-3)

**Too much class time is occupied with questions like** ‘’What did Hegel mean by …?’’ and ‘**’What was your** third **criticism of util**itarianism**?’’** While such an approach may have paedeutic value its relevance is nonetheless questionable. The students must be encouraged to develop independent thinking ability and form opinions of their own. Pedagogical techniques, including small group discussions, debates, films and ‘’clever’’ essay examination need to be employed to illustrate the difference between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Also practical computer and information technology (IT) training needs to be made compulsory. The students may be asked to go on a compulsory period of attachment in a computer school and show evidence of successful completion of the training before resuming their philosophical studies.

The point made here is that **philosophy must be** ‘’problem focused’’ and attempt to be **“problem solving”** in socially important problems and establish its integrative function with other disciplines. By so doing philosophy will affirm its relevance, significance and value with the fresh insights and perspectives it reveals to these other disciplines. The philosopher’s skills and attitude which makes him far-sighted and extra perceptive will earn him recognition and respect. The non-philosophy major groomed in the inter-disciplinary approach and who has properly cultivated the critical skills and attitude of Philosophy will bring this to bear on his major disciplines and then ultimately come to the realization that habitually and persistently he must keep an open-mind and rethink the possibilities of his discipline, he might well come to accept as legitimate some new ways of relating to other disciplines –ways which would be consistent with and employ insights of the traditions of his major discipline but still would allow a more fruitful complementary existence. The philosophy major properly groomed in the interdisciplinary approach to studying philosophy and having adequately cultivated the necessary skills and attitude is pragmatic, dynamic, mobile and versatile. He it is who can “bake bread’’. It is to this calibre of trained philosophers that Ozumba states, ‘’can work any where’’ (Ozumba;2002:3). Ozumba’s work, *A Philosophy Handbook for Beginners: Value Application and Career Opportunities for Philosophers* is a ‘’must read’’ for Nigerian undergraduates of philosophy. Conclusion So far I have distinguished between ‘’Ivory tower’’ Philosophy and ‘’market place’’ Philosophy. **Ivory tower Philosophy** is academic Philosophy which **insists that Philosophy must** be done in the traditional professional manner with systematicity, analytic rigour, logical coherence, and technicality, mainly **address**ing problems and issues in **the classical traditions** of Philosophy**.** **“Market place” Philosophy**, on the other hand, though not discountenancing the need for rigorousness and systematicity, **maintains that academic Philosophy can** be done in the non-traditional manner and made to **address concrete existential problems** within our cultural circumstance **which encourages the** professional **philosopher to participate in public debate of issues of contemporary relevance.** I have also maintained that **“ivory tower” philosophy is the reason for** the **isolation**, alienation, marginalization **and perceived irrelevance of academic philosophy today.** I posit that professionalism in philosophy and its teaching should be reconceived and restructured. I propose that the interdisciplinary strategy for teaching philosophy should be promoted so as to establish the integrative function of philosophy and its integral connection with other disciplines and ultimately interdisciplinary integration. This approach, I maintain, should also stress the utilitarian aspects of the study of philosophy.

You can’t separate your philosophy from its historical context. Enlightenment philosophy is racist at its core. It relies on an erasure of material differences in identity. **Mills 02** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

"Person," then is really a technical term, a term of art, referring to a status whose attainment requires more than simple humanity. Mehta argues that liberalism presupposes a political anthropology: "**[T]he exclusionary basis of liberalism does**, I believe, **derive from its theoretical core,** and the litany of exclusionary historical instances is an elaboration of this core.... **behind** the **capacities ascribed to all human beings exists a thicker set of social credentials** that constitutes the real bases of political inclusion." 16 And **these social credentials are** generally **out of the reach of** non-Europeans, **nonwhites**, who are **covered by** a different set of categories, **the category of the "savage" and** the **"barbarian**.**"** No less than "men" or "person," then, **these** need to be seen as **[are]** technical theoretical **terms adverting to a** peculiar ontological/**moral**/political **status which legitimates their possessors’ exclusion from the rights and freedoms enjoyed by whites.** It is not at all a matter of "contradictions," internal inconsistencies, but of a consistent exclusivist white egalitarianism which is now, in contradiction to the actual historical record, being denied and retroactively projected backward as colorless. The concept of a "sub-person," then, formally registers this actual division in modern Western political theory, and by its overt presence, and the set of implications and ramifications its introduction establishes, illuminates an architecture that I would claim is already there in these theories but currently obfuscated by the illusory inclusiveness of "persons" read backwardly as raceneutral. Sub-persons are humanoid entities who, because of deficiencies linked with race, lack the moral status requisite for enjoyment of the bundle of rights and freedoms appropriate for persons. Writings that currently seem irrelevant, remarks which seem like throwaway lines, comments which seem puzzlingly inconsistent with (what we have been taught is) the "theory," are no longer marginalized but integrated into a theoretical whole. Putting this simply, the contrast between the orthodox "anomaly" view of racism, and the "symbiosis" view I am advocating, can be represented as follows. Let T be the (egalitarian) moral/political theory of the modern white Western philosopher in question; p stand for person; and sp for sub-person. Mainstream commentary is basically saying that: For philosopher P: 13. Catherine Wilson, "Introduction--Social Inequality: Rousseau in Retrospect," in Wilson, ed., Civilization and Oppression, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 25 (Calgary, Alta.: University of Calgary Press, 1999), pp. 18, 22, T asserts egalitarianism for all p, where p is race-neutral. Racist statements are then an exception, and not part of T. And what, by contrast, I am recommending as an interpretive framework, is: For philosopher P: T asserts egalitarianism for all p, where whiteness is a necessary condition for p T asserts non-egalitarianism for sp, where nonwhiteness is (approximately) a sufficient condition for sp. 17 Racist statements are then part of T, not an exception. On both views, racism can be admitted—the charge is not that mainstream views cannot concede racism. The crucial question is how they frame it, whether as anomaly/contradiction, etc. or as an integral/symbiotic part of the theory. It will be appreciated, then, that this semantic innovation, so simple to describe, would, if adopted, quite radically transform our view of modern Western moral/political philosophy. We would have to start thinking of these theorists, and their theories, quite differently from how they are presented in the standard textbook. This does not rule out, of course, a sanitized retrieval and reappropriation of their theories. But it would have to be explicitly acknowledged that that is what we are doing, that we are not reading them as they intended. So it is not that liberalism and egalitarianism, abstract L and E, were historically meant to extend to everybody. Rather, we would need to talk about racialized liberalism and racialized egalitarianism, RL and RE. Racism would then emerge, as it should, as a normative system in its own right— indeed, as the actual normative system obtaining for most of the modern period. And just as the hierarchical ideologies of the ancient and medieval world were multiply-tiered, with different standings (of class) for different sets of human beings, we would be forced to acknowledge that (actual, historical) **liberalism** also **is** a **two-tiered** ideology**,** with a **different status assigned to**, and correspondingly differentiated norms prescribed for, **whites and nonwhites.** The orthodox narrative of modernity would have to be rewritten; the orthodox cartography of the political would have to be redrawn. Apart from being—unlike the present narrative—true to the actual historical record, and so demanding implementation on those grounds alone, this transformation would have the great virtue of uniting the conceptual spaces and periodization times of the white political and the nonwhite political. **Textbooks authorize** an account of **the history of Western political philosophy** which moves smoothly from Plato to Rawls **without dealing with race, as if,** in the modern period, **Western theorists were proclaiming their egalitarian views as fully applicable to everybody.** The West is constructed in such a way that racism and white racial domination have been no part of the history of the West, and the normative superiority of whites to nonwhites, justified by these theorists, has been no part of that history. A mystified account of political philosophy complements a mystified account of recent world history, in which **the central role of** imperialism and **racial domination has been** either **sanitized** or written **out of the record altogether, so** that the distinctive features of **the political struggles of nonwhites** (abolitionist, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, antisegregationist) **vanish into a white darkness.** 10 My claim is, then, that if we read these theorists and take their references to "men" or "persons" in a race-neutral way, we will in fact be misrepresenting them and distorting their theoretical intentions. Since this is exactly what has been done by generations of commentators, and continues to be routinely done today, it means that in crucial respects we have a fictive picture of the content and significance of modern Western moral and political philosophy. The deployment of my "revisionist" vocabulary—in scare quotes, since I am claiming that this is just a formalization of what these philosophers actually thought—then makes explicit what they were really arguing for. II. Kant’s Racial Views and Their Implications These points have been general. **Let us now turn specifically to Kant.** In a sense, Kant is perfect for my thesis (had he not existed, critical race theorists would have had to invent him), because of the combination of his absolute centrality (with the aforementioned rise to hegemony of "deontological liberalism") to contemporary moral and political theory, and the detailed explicitness of his writings on race. Within my revisionist framework, far from its being a terrible irony, or a shocking contradiction, that the theorist sometimes honored with the status of the father of modern moral theory is now also being credited as the father, or one of the fathers (maybe, given his apparently nonexistent sex life, it should be the godfather?), of modern racism, it is wonderfully appropriate, a perfect vindication of my claims. For in my framework of "symbiosis" rather than "anomaly," it is only fitting that the philosopher who provides the richest account of "personhood" for the Age of Egalitarianism should also provide the richest account of "sub-personhood" for what is also the Age of Global White Supremacy. Once the conventional framework is inverted, and the conceptual barriers breached, so that we start conceptualizing racism as an alternative normative system, which has in fact been the real normative system, then what would originally have seemed oxymoronic suddenly becomes pleonastic. If "personhood" is raced, then of course there will be a different set of rules for persons and sub-persons. What else would one, in consistency, expect? Kant's reputational commitment to moral egalitarianism is presumably so celebrated as to need no extensive gloss. As Roger Sullivan writes, "Kant's is an ethics of the people, of moral egalitarianism.... Respect is an attitude due equally to every person, simply because each is a person, a rational being capable of moral self-determination." 18 We see here the ambiguity I have tried to expose in the term "person." If "person" is already tacitly morally normed, then as a statement of Kant's views (or anybody's), this is tautologous ("Respect is an attitude due equally to every human who deserves equal respect"); but if "person" just means "human," it becomes far more questionable, and, I would in fact say, as a statement of Kant's own views, simply false. Feminists have long argued that the use of generic, gender-neutral language in discussing Western philosophers' moral/political views is misleading, and I would claim that this argument goes through even more forcefully and dramatically for race, since people of color do not even have the necessarily (as against contingently) functional status within the white household that white women have, so they can die off (not an abstract possibility by any means, as we will see below), without disrupting (indeed perhaps facilitating?!) the functioning of the white polity. Unlike the case of some other philosophers, such as Locke, **Kant's racial views are explicit**, needing no inferential reconstruction. Moreover, it is not a matter of a few incidental remarks but a full-blown and elaborate theory. Emmanuel Eze's important essay of a few years ago brought to a North American philosophical audience the shocking news—shocking only to philosophers, since it had long been known by historians and anthropologists— that **Kant was one of the central figures in the birth of scientific racism.** 19 In fact, Robert Bernasconi suggests that "if any one person should be recognized as the author of the first theory of race worthy of the name, it should be the German philosopher Immanuel Kant," discounting the claims of more familiar candidates such as Carolus Linnaeus, George-Louis Buffon, and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. 20 **Kant's** lectures and **writings on anthropology** and physical geography (usually ignored by philosophers) **provide a detailed account of a racialized human nature classified into** four categories—white Europeans, yellow Asians, black Africans, red Amerindians—who are related to one another in **a hierarchy of superiors and inferiors.** (See handout for details.)

Political philosophy specifically must be grounded in historical realities.

**Rhonheimer 05** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

It is a fundamental feature of political philosophy to be part of practical philosophy. **Political philosophy** belongs to ethics, which **is practical, for it both reflects on practical knowledge and aims at action. Therefore,** it is not only normative, but must consider the concrete conditions of realization. The rationale of **political institutions** and action **must be understood** as embedded **in concrete** cultural and, therefore, **historical contexts** and as meeting with problems that only in these contexts are understandable. A normative political philosophy which would abstract from the conditions of realizability would be trying to establish norms for realizing the “idea of the good” or of “the just” (as Plato, in fact, tried to do in his Republic). Such **a purely metaphysical view**, however, **is doomed to failure.** As a theory of political praxis, political philosophy must include in its reflection the concrete historical context, historical experiences and the corresponding knowledge of the proper logic of the political. 14 Briefly: political philosophy is not metaphysics, which contemplates the necessary order of being, but practical philosophy, which deals with partly contingent matters and aims at action. **Moreover,** unlike moral norms in general—natural law included,—which rule the actions of a person—“my acting” and pursuing the good—, the logic of **the political is** characterized by acts like **framing institutions** and establishing legal rules **by which** not only personal actions but the actions of **a multitude of persons are regulated** by the coercive force of state power, and by which a part of citizens exercises power over others. **Political actions are, thus,** both actions **of the whole of the body politic** and referring to the whole of the community of citizens. 15 Unless we wish to espouse a platonic view according to which some persons are by nature rulers while others are by nature subjects, we will stick to the Aristotelian differentiation between the “domestic” and the “political” kind of rule: unlike domestic rule, which is over people with a common interest and harmoniously striving after the same good and, therefore, according to Aristotle is essentially “despotic,” **political rule is exercised over free persons who represent a plurality of interests** and pursue, in the common context of the polis, different goods. The exercise of such political rule, therefore, needs justification and is continuously in search of consent among those who are ruled, but who potentially at the same time are also the rulers.

The resolution is a practical imperative. “Ought” can only refer to action, even when used in the context of “ought to be.” **Prichard 12** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

But this argument, if it is to restore the sense of obligation to act, must presuppose an intermediate link, viz., the further thesis that what is good ought to be. The necessity of this link is obvious. An "ought," if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." Moreover this link tacitly presupposes another, viz., that the apprehension that something good which is not an action ought to be involves just the feeling of imperativeness or obligation which is to be aroused by the thought of the action which will originate it. Otherwise the argument will not lead us to feel the obligation to produce it by the action. And, surely, both this link and its implication are false.[1](http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html#1) **The word "ought" refers to actions and to actions alone.** The proper language is never "So and so ought to be," but "I ought to do so and so." **Even if we** are sometimes moved to **say** that the world or **something** in it **is not what it ought to be, what we really mean is that** God or **some human** being **has not made something what he [or she] ought to have made it.** And it is merely stating another side of this fact to urge that **we can only feel the imperativeness** upon us **of something which is in our power; for** it is **actions and actions alone** which, directly at least, **are in our power.**

Appeals to abstract rights like due process are meaningless and fail to respect citizens. The state coopts rights rhetoric to legitimize oppression. **Hudson 08** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

Marx suggests that capitalism does not merely strip human beings of the capabilities that make them unique in the animal world but denies them even the basic dignity of other animals. At the same time that humans produce commodities and the social conditions of the exchange economy, they produce concepts that bolster these conditions. **Human rights granted by contract with the nation become abstract concepts that have little bearing on the material lives of unfree citizens. The civil liberties promised by the nation are a fiction; stripping them away is a mere formality when the worker is already little more than bare life.** This state of affairs is an inversion of his previous position; it is now ironically the animal in nature that is *more* free than the human in “free” society. **The formal freedom granted to human beings under liberal democracy leaves them destitute, lacking any recourse to lord or law, and entraps them in a second nature just as driven by the needs of self-preservation as the natural world of animals.**

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

The affirmative interrogates the historical phenomenon of the prison industrial complex. It is the overarching superstructure that justifies prison violence based on the suppression of brown bodies. **Rodriguez 7** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

We might imagine **the U.S. prison**, not as a discrete institution or reified place, but rather as **[is] an abstracted site**—a prototype—**of** organized **punishment and** (social, civil, and biological) **death.** I begin this section with two points of departure, in an attempt to initially provoke a conceptualization of the American prison regime that focuses on the intertwining of two structural logics: 1) white supremacy as a historical modality of social (dis)organization, and 2) the capacity of allegedly “local” or “domestic” U.S. social formations to circulate, militarize, and mobilize across global geographies. The emergence of the American prison industrial complex since the 1970s is generally addressed as a problem of the “American nation,” and until recently has largely been situated by academic scholars, progressive activists, and imprisoned intellectuals within the domains of the domestic social formation. Yet, even the concise definition of the prison industrial complex penned in 2001 by U.S. political prisoner Linda Evans (released in 2001) and activist Eve Goldberg facilitates an inquiry that pushes past parochial geographies of the U.S. national form: “Like the military/industrial complex, **the prison industrial complex is an interweaving of private business and government** interests. Its twofold purpose is **[for] profit and social control.** Its public rationale is the fight against crime” (Evans and Goldberg). Beyond the strictures of conventional criminological approaches to the U.S. prison apparatus, Evans and Goldberg are suggesting **[There is] a**n organic **connection between** the architecture of **the prison industrial complex and** the structuring forces of **neoliberalism and globalization:** the **socioeconomic transformations of U.S. capital, alongside** contemporary elaborations of **the U.S. racist state** in the post-Civil Rights moment, **simultaneously** a.) **fabricate[s] populations vulnerable to criminalization (black, brown, [and] poor**, and generically redundant to the contemporary economic organization of the U.S.); b.) withdraw state social services for people most in need of resources for social and biological reproduction; c.) militarize and juridically empower the policing and criminal justice apparatuses in unprecedented ways while amplifying their fundamentally punitive institutional demeanours; and d.) generate a dynamic statecraft, public discourse, and popular culture of policing and imprisonment that organize a grammar of social necessity and ideological consent around the emergence and expansion of the prison industrial complex. Here we must remember that among the millions of people held captive by the U.S. state in prisons, jails, youth prisons, and immigration detention, **people of African descent are imprisoned at rates astronomically high relative to their proportion of the** national **population** (exceeding 400% of their national demographic proportion), and at rates dwarfing those of white Americans (see Gershowitz). Native Americans repeat this pattern, although their smaller demographic numbers often obscure their heightened criminalization by the U.S. state. Latinos, Latinas, and **other** racialized **brown people are** increasingly **targeted in ways that** directly derive from, and **expand**, the **historical structures of white supremacist policing and imprisonment** that target Black and indigenous people, in part through the specificities of migrant/immigrant policing and criminalization. Despite composing the national majority of the U.S. population, **white Americans compose less than half of the incarcerated U.S. population.** Black, Brown, and indigenous peoples constitute upwards of 60% held captive. For the unfamiliar, a few other facts assist in laying bare the accelerated nature of this massive state-sanctioned project: 1 Between 1972 and 2003, the imprisoned (jail and prison) population in the U.S. increased more than 600%; for the five decades prior to the 1970s, the incarcerated population had remained relatively stable, hovering between 100,000-200,000. 2 The U.S. boasts of the highest rate of incarceration in the world, at 702 per 100,000 in the general population; this rate is between 500 and 800% that of comparable industrialized nations. 3 African Americans are incarcerated at nearly six times the rate of whites (2,290 per 100,000 versus 412 per 100,000), while Hispanics are incarcerated at nearly double the rate of whites (742 per 100,000). 4 **According to one of the most rigorous criminological studies to date** (examining the period 1980-1996)**,** **the imprisonment increase does not derive from objective changes in** the commission of **crime**s**, but** rather is almost entirely owed to **political**ly formed **changes in** sentencing and **criminal justice policy** (see Gershowitz). Thus, as the U.S. prison, jail, INS/Homeland Security detainee and incarcerated youth population approaches and surpasses the 2.5 million mark (as of this writing), the quantitative evidence refracts the prison’s qualitative transformation into a fundamental organ of state reproduction and civic ordering. Variable, overlapping, and mutually constituting white supremacist regimes have in fact been fundamental to the formation and movements of the United States, from racial chattel slavery and frontier genocide to recent and current modes of neoliberal land displacement and (domestic-to-global) warfare. Without exception, these regimes have been differently entangled with the state’s changing paradigms, strategies, and technologies of human incarceration and punishment (to follow the prior examples: the plantation, the reservation, the neoliberal sweatshop, and the domestic-to-global prison). The historical nature of these entanglements is widely acknowledged, although explanations of the structuring relations of force tend to either isolate or historically compartmentalize the complexities of historical white supremacy. For the theoretical purposes of this essay, white supremacy may be understood as a logic of social organization that produces regimented, institutionalized, and militarized conceptions of hierarchized “human” difference, enforced through coercions and violences that are structured by genocidal possibility (including physical extermination and curtailment of people’s collective capacities to socially, culturally, or biologically reproduce). As a historical vernacular and philosophical apparatus of domination, white supremacy is simultaneously premised on and consistently innovating universalized conceptions of the white (European and euroamerican) “human” vis-à-vis the rigorous production, penal discipline, and frequent social, political, and biological neutralization or extermination of the (non-white) sub- or non-human. To consider white supremacy as essential to American social formation (rather than a freakish or extremist deviation from it) facilitates a discussion of the modalities through which this material logic of violence overdetermines the social, political, economic, and cultural structures that compose American globality and constitute the common sense that is organic to its ordering.

The domestic prison industrial complex is the root cause of US militaristic violence abroad. Abu Ghraib is the paradigm example. **Rodriguez 7** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

**Located within a genealogy of the U.S. prison regime,** the drama of **Abu Ghraib** can be understood as **[is]** significantly **entangled with** the durable affective and sentimental structures of racial chattel **slavery.** Literary and cultural theorist Saidiya V. Hartman has convincingly argued that this genealogy of **human captivity is founded on the Black** captive’s/**slave’s availability for the** multiply invested **coercions of the “free” white master** community: [T]he fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion. (21) Prison torture and other state practices of carceral bodily violence, within and beyond Abu Ghraib, can be conceptualized as a technology of captivity that is traceable to the epochal everyday of slavery’s regulated antiblack violence. Reading through Hartman’s genealogy, Abu Ghraib becomes “scandalous” only as a globally visible production of the illicit, the private (or secret), and the normal of the United States as a social and racial formation that is not only inseparable from, but is in fact produced by its regimes of bodily capture and disintegration. Here, the scandal of hypervisibility enmeshing the prison tortures at Abu Ghraib unwittingly reveals both the normality and unremarkability of the U.S. prison regime’s historical everyday, which is traceable in its current racialized and white supremacist form to the nominal abolition of racial chattel slavery and the replacement of the slave plantation with new forms of antiblack criminalization and an incipient apartheid prison apparatus; note that the text of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which is commonly referenced as the passage that formally extinguished the institution of slavery in 1865, reads as follows: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction” (emphasis added). Thus, **the logic of** chattel **enslavement was formally transposed from the body of the (racially defined) slave to the body of the (racially criminalized) prisoner**/convict: as such, the everyday matrices of social and political intercourse historically composed by the epoch of U.S. racial slavery have sustained through the institutional nuances and movements of the prison regime. The exhibited tortures at Abu Ghraib prison, to the extent that they have been treated with analytics and rhetorics invoking (or at least inferring) novelty, uniqueness, and discontinuity with precedent (and for that matter contemporaneous) forms of U.S. militarization and incarceration, have generated a political and theoretical noise that substantively fails to account for their substantive legibility within the prison regime’s longer genealogy, as well as the simultaneity of its geographically dispersed violences. By way of example: **virtually simultaneous with** the international circulation of the **Abu Ghraib** photos **was a** mind-numbing **series of revelations** in the Los Angeles Times **regarding the** normative operation of the **California Youth** Authority (CYA), among the largest **prison system**s in the world devoted to incarcerating children and youth. In April 2004, California State Senator Gloria Romero (a noteworthy progressive critic of the California criminal justice apparatus) publicly released a videotape depicting a pair of CYA officers overpowering and mercilessly beating Vincent Baker and Narcisco Morales in a small office at the Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facility, Stockton, CA (Warren “Videotaping” B1+). CA Attorney General Bill Lockyer chose not to charge the guards with a crime, citing “insufficient evidence.” A second surveillance tape surfaced the next month, also from Chaderjian YCF, showing another correctional officer releasing a trained German shepherd on Manuel Renteria. Renteria survived the attack, suffering severe nerve damage (Warren “Attack” B1+). A month or so prior to the eruption of the Abu Ghraib scandal, in February 2004, the families of Deon Whitfield and Durrell Taddon Feaster filed claims against the CYA, contending that the two young men’s “suicides” were produced by heinous institutional negligence, cruel and unusual punishment, and hostile indifference to the young men’s medical needs (Chong B6). The CYA was also accused of tampering with evidence after doubts arose over the verity of its hasty characterization of the deaths as suicides. **The litany of institutional violence** during this most recent period (2004-2005) **continues ad nauseam, ranging from** consistent reports of **sexual assault** by guards **and** the ongoing use of long-term (sixty-ninety days) **isolation** confinement, **to the** innovation of **single person steel cage** “classrooms” and the first-resort pepper-spraying of imprisoned mentally ill youth. I offer this snapshot of normalized “torture” and “brutality” in California youth prisons to suggest that excessive carceral state violence, while nominally illegal, is generally state-sanctioned (that is, unprosecuted and unacknowledged as such) even when it obtains momentary currency in the realm of public discourse. Further, such critical counter-state testimonials addressing the “local” sites of the U.S. prison regime amount, with a few notable exceptions, to little more than a muted echo of the far more widespread and urgent discussions of prison torture that have been articulated by outraged Americans and elements of the global left in relation to prisoners tortured and brutalized under the auspices of the American prison regime, but whom are located outside the domestic dominion of the U.S. proper. Thus, throughout 2004, this state-proctored punishment and biological/civil/social death of racially criminalized children and young adults in California largely eluded the most immediate political concern, if not broader social vision, of these multiple U.S. and global publics, which were preoccupied with making political fetish of the U.S. military’s prisons in Cuba and Iraq. While **the CYA’s** (non)scenes of captivity and bodily **violence** preceded, accompanied, and enmeshed the international spectacle of Abu Ghraib prison, they **ultimately** merely **reinscribed a domestic structure of punishment** and death **that has been** 1.) culturally assimilated into the normative functioning of the U.S. state and its presumed symbiosis with civil society; 2.) institutionally integrated into American modalities of social reproduction across scales of locality, region, and nation; and 3.) politically coded as a necessary evil, that is, **hegemonically constructed as a primary technology of** post-1970s **“law and order” and the executor of** a presumptive **communal** and personal **“security.”** Looking closely at the current formation of the U.S. prison regime, in this sense, illuminates the white supremacist animus of what many call the American empire. The violence of U.S.-led neoliberal globalization and American state-fashioned (declared and covert) warfare actually speak to the complexity of the U.S. prison regime as a production (and no less as a harnessing and deployment) of technologies of racial bodily violence. This also suggests a practical/activist and scholarly/theoretical centering of white supremacy (in particular, white supremacist state violence) as a fundamental condition of American globality in this moment. A new paradigm of state and state-sanctioned, mass-based and intimate coercion posits strategic, racially articulated human imprisonment (and the violence therein) as the premise (rather than the utilitarian and self-contained “means”) of hegemonic power itself: thus, American global statecraft has become unimaginable outside its prominent productions of incarcerating technologies as material paradigms of dominance, occupation, and political ascendancy.

The terminal impact is American globality which causes global warmongering. This controls the link to your terminal impacts. They’re not real – just a result of hegemonic threat construction. **Rodriguez 7** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

Further, in offering this initial attempt at such a framing, I am suggesting a genealogy of U.S. state violence that can more sufficiently conceptualize the logical continuities and material articulations between a) the ongoing projects of domestic warfare organic to the white supremacist U.S. racial state, and b) the array of “global” (or extra- domestic) technologies of violence that form the premises of possibility for those social formations and hegemonies integral to the contemporary moment of U.S. global dominance. In this sense, I am amplifying the capacity of the U.S. prison to inaugurate technologies of power that exceed its nominal relegation to the domain of the criminal-juridical. Consider imprisonment, then, as a practice of social ordering and geopolitical power, rather than as a self-contained or foreclosed jurisprudential practice: therein, it is possible to reconceptualize the significance of the Abu Ghraib spectacle as only one signification of a regime of dominance that is neither (simply) local nor (erratically) exceptional, but is simultaneously mobilized, proliferating, and global. The overarching concern animating this essay revolves around the peculiarity of U.S. global dominance in the historical present: that is, given the geopolitical dispersals and dislocations, as well as the differently formed social relations generated by U.S. hegemonies across sites and historical contexts, what modalities of “rule” and statecraft give form and coherence to the (spatial-temporal) transitions, (institutional-discursive) rearticulations, and (apparent) novelties of “War on Terror” neoliberalism? Put differently, what technologies and institutionalities thread between forms of state and state-sanctioned dominance that are nominally autonomous of the U.S. state, but are no less implicated in the global reach of U.S. state formation? The intent of this initial foray into a theoretical project that admittedly exceeds the strictures of a self-contained journal article is primarily suggestive: on the one hand, I wish to examine how the institutional matrix and technological module of the U.S. prison regime (a concept I will develop in the next section of the essay) is a programmatic (that is, strategic and structural rather than conspiratorial or fleeting) condensation of specific formations of racial and white supremacist state violence and is produced by the twinned, simultaneous Kritika Kultura, Issue 9, November 2007 51 logics of social ordering/disruption (e.g. the prison as both and at once the exemplar of effective “criminal justice” law-and-order and culprit in the mass-based familial and community disruption of criminalized populations). On the other hand, I am interested in considering how **the visceral** and institutionally abstracted logic of **bodily domination** that materially forms and reproduces the regime **of the** American **prison is fundamental**, not ancillary, **to U.S.** state-mediated, state-influenced, and state-sanctioned methods of legitimated **“local” state violence across the global horizon**. To put a finer edge on this latter point, it is worth noting that given the plethora of scholarly and activist engagements with U.S. global dominance that has emerged in recent times, and the subsequent theoretical nuance and critical care provided to treatments of (for example) U.S. corporate capital, military/warmaking capacity, and mass culture, relatively little attention has been devoted to the constitutive role of the U.S. prison in articulating the techniques, meanings, and pragmatic forms of state-building within post- 1990s social formations, including those of the U.S.’s ostensible peer states, as well as places wherein militarized occupation, postcolonial subjection, and proto-colonial relations overdetermine the ruling order. In place of considering the U.S. prison as a dynamic, internally complex mobilization of state power and punitive social ordering, such engagements tend to treat the prison as if it were, for the most part, a self-evident outcome or exterior symptom of domination rather than a central, interior facet of how domination is itself conceptualized and produced. In this meditation I am concerned with the integral role of the U.S. prison regime in Kritika Kultura, Issue 9, November 2007 52 the material/cultural production of “American globality.” In using this phrase **I am suggesting a process** and module **of state power** that works, moves, and deploys in ways **distinct from** (though fundamentally in concert with) American (global) **“hegemony,”** and inaugurates a geography of biopolitical power more focused than common scholarly cartographies of American “empire.” For my purposes, American **globality refers to the postmodern production of** U.S. state and state-sanctioned technologies of human and ecological **domination**—most frequently formed **through** overlapping and interacting regimes of profound bodily violence, including **genocidal** and protogenocidal **violence, warmaking,** racist and white supremacist state violence, **and mass-scaled imprisonment**—and the capacity of these forms of domination to be mobilized across political geographies all over the world, including by governments and states that are nominally autonomous of the United States. **American globality is** simultaneously a vernacular of institutional power, an active and accessible iteration of violent human domination as the cohering of sociality (and civil society) writ large, and **a grammar of pragmatic** immediacy (in fact, **urgency**) **that orders and influences statecraft across** various **geographies** of jurisdiction and influence. It is in this sense of globality as (common) vernacular, (dynamic, present tense) iteration, and (disciplining) grammar that the current formation of global order is constituted (obviously) by the direct interventions of the U.S. state and (not as obviously) by the lexicon (as in the principles governing the organization of a vocabulary) of U.S. statecraft. American globality infers how the U.S. state conceptualizes its own power, as well as how these conceptualizations of power and American state formation become immediately useful to—and frequently, structurally and politically overbearing on—other state formations and hegemonies. The prison regime, in other words, is indisputably organic to the lexicon of the U.S. state, and is thus productive of American globality, not a by-product or reified outcome of it. In the remainder of this essay, I raise the possibility that the **U.S. conceptualization of the prison** as a peculiar mobilization of power and domination **is**, in the historical present, **central to how states**, governments, and social orderings **all over the world are formulating their own responses to** the political, ecological, and **social crises** of neoliberalism, **warfare, and global white supremacy.**

Rehabilitation isn’t punishment-based. It entails programs that focus on helping the criminal, not blaming them. **Lab et al. 04 defines**[[11]](#footnote-11)

**Rehabilitation does not advocate punishing criminals, but rather** seeks to prevent crime by rectifying problems that are thought to be responsible for the criminal behavior. Examples of rehabilitation include **[programs like] drug treatment, mental health counseling, and job training.** **Rehabilitation assumes that criminals can be reformed and** that, once reformed, they will **no longer engage in crime.** Thus, according to this perspective, the best way for society to combat crime is through treatment and reformation. For more information about rehabilitation, see Cullen and Gilbert (1989).

Valuing retribution over rehab is the ideological source of the prison industrial complex. The United States justifies violent interventions in countries like Iraq through xenophobic threat construction that is rooted in its domestic prison system. **Sudbury 04** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

From the War on Crime to the War on Iraq, and Back Again   
The **failure to locate**[**w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/weapons+of+mass+destruction) **in Iraq**, and indications that British and U.S. politicians knowingly exaggerated intelligence reports about the potential threat posed by the Hussein regime, have **demonstrated that the "war on terror" is not driven** primarily **by the desire to rid the world of** the threat of **terror**ism**.** Though antiwar posters that read "No Blood for Oil" accurately identified U.S. corporate and state interests in controlling Iraqi oil deposits, the [wars in Afghanistan](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Wars+in+Afghanistan) and Iraq were not waged simply to feed the U.S. addiction to fossil fuels. Rather, contemporary **U.S. military interventions have the** sweeping **goal of establishing** a new world order based on **neoliberal globalization.** In 2001, two years after the battle for Seattle brought the anti-globalization movement into the spotlight, the imperial project of remaking the global economy for U.S. corporate interests was on shaky footing. The anti-globalization movement was at a highpoint, leading world economic and political elites to meet in ever more secluded locations. Argentina, the Washington Consensus poster child, was [in the midst](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/in+the+midst) of an economic crisis that would ultimately lead to a popular uprising and the resignation of neoliberal President Fernando de la Rua. The failure of IMF-led economic restructuring to bring stability or prosperity to global South nations, combined with popular insurgencies against free trade and neoliberal economic prescriptions, presaged the possible collapse of the Washington Consensus and with it, U.S. global political and economic hegemony.   
Between the Seattle uprisings and September 11, 2001, the G8 and corporate elites were on the defensive, forced into the position of trying to put a kinder face on free trade and repackaging the World Trade Organization and [IMF](http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/IMF) as agencies dedicated to poverty reduction and debt relief for highly indebted nations. However, the bloody attacks of September 11 provided the ideological fodder for a new aggressive stance. **Reinterpreted as an offensive against the people of the U**nited **S**tates**, rather than** one **against** the symbols of U.S. **capitalism and militarism,** the [**September 11** attacks](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/September+11+attacks)**turned "average Americans" against their counterparts outside U.S. borders. With popular support at home for violent retribution** and repression around the world, the **Bush administration was given free reign to replace any regime** hostile to the vision of a world dominated by U.S. economic interests **with puppet regimes.** Bush's National Security Strategy spells out these military goals. The U.S. military, it declares, will "ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade" (U.S. National Security Council, 2002: Section VI). Indeed, as the [reconstruction of Iraq](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Reconstruction+of+Iraq) continues, "Operation Iraqi Freedom" will perhaps be relabeled "Operation Iraqi Free Trade." For as Naomi Klein (2003) points out, Iraq has become "a blank slate on which the most ideological Washington neoliberals can design their dream economy: fully privatized, foreign-owned, and open for business."   
The elimination of regulations limiting foreign ownership of Iraqi companies and infrastructure, ostensibly to encourage foreign investors to assist with reconstruction efforts, is the first step in the radical opening of Iraq to the global economy. U.S. administrators are pursuing this radical economic surgery, despite the fact that the same process in the former Soviet Union resulted in rampant poverty, social instability, and the rise of organized crime. Iraqi protestors taking to the streets shortly after the [fall of Baghdad](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Fall+of+Baghdad) were more succinct. Their slogan, "We will not sell out our country," suggested that the Iraqi people were at risk of being "sold out" and "sold off." U.S. corporations, many with senior political connections to the Bush administration, are the major beneficiaries of the reconstruction effort. Just as the war itself boosted the stock of the U.S. arms industry and private military companies, the **rebuilding of Iraq has generated** multimillion-dollar **contracts for U.S.** oil and manufacturing **companies.** The Bush administration has rejected the idea of a permanent colonial presence in Iraq, but this is hardly necessary for the neoliberal transformation of Iraq. With U.S.-headquartered multinationals receiving a monopoly on rebuilding roads, bridges, water and sewage plants, communications systems, and other infrastructure, it is clear that Iraq will have become a neocolonial outpost long before the last U.S. troops are withdrawn ([Ridgeway](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Ridgeway), 2003). The war against Iraq, and the war on terror in general, reflects a Bush administration decision to use military force to do what the Clinton regime and IMF did through diplomacy, free trade agreements, and the [carrot and stick](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Carrot+and+stick) of Third World debt--creating new markets for the U.S. capitalist elite. In this sense, regime change in Iraq is the first step toward establishing a free trade area sympathetic to the U.S. in the region. This "U.S.-Middle East Free Trade Area" would join [NAFTA](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/NAFTA), [NEPAD](http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/NEPAD), and the much-contested FTAA in remaking the world for U.S. multinational capital (U.S. Department of State, 2003).   
A little noted aspect of the Iraqi occupation has been the **centrality of images of crime** in **[was] generating the aura of legitimacy for U.S. intervention. During the invasion** and in the immediate aftermath, while U.S. troops were posing for photo opportunities with "grateful" liberated Iraqis, **looters were raiding hospitals, museums, and libraries** and removing priceless antiquities. Although the U.S. authorities in Iraq turned a blind eye during the worst of the looting, suggesting that a repressed people were "letting off steam," this attitude swiftly hardened when U.S. troops, allies, and infrastructure became a target. **When a plethora of groups opposing the occupation**--from Ba'athists to Sunni and Shia religious followers--**began to take violent direct action,** [paternalism](http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/paternalism) was replaced with a tough, punitive attitude toward these "criminals and terrorists." Blaming the violence on "criminals" released by Hussein from Iraqi prisons during the invasion, **the U.S.** administration **sought to mask the extent** to which gun **violence**, armed militias, and a [pandemic](http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Pandemic) of violence against women were **[was] a direct consequence of** the vacuum created by **an occupying power with little legitimacy on the streets.** At the same rime, the focus on "terrorists" and foreign opportunists distracted attention from a growing resistance movement (Ali, 2003). The **criminalization of dissent in Iraq** has **proceeded so rapidly that** Paul **Bremer's** $87 billion dollar **reconstruction budget** announced in September 2003, just four months after the official end of the war, **included** $400 million for **two 4,000-bed prisons.** The replacement of the dilapidated prisons of the Hussein era with **U.S.-style** multimillion-dollar high-tech **superjails will** inevitably **bring** U.S. headquartered private **prison corporations into the** lucrative **reconstruction business.** Facilities housing thousands of prisoners, known as **"superjails," are common in the U.S.**, yet most other nations have not traditionally constructed these massive structures. The architecture of the superjail is indicative of a particular philosophy of crime and punishment. In the past 20 years, three principles have underpinned penal expansion in the U.S.: penal [incapacitation](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Incapacitation), deterrence, and fiscal efficiency. **Rather than conceptualize prisons as places where rehab**ilitation **should take place to prepare a prisoner for** reentry into **society**, the workplace, and family life, **"new generation" prisons were designed to** meet three goals. First,they should **permit the removal from society** and warehousing of large numbers **of population groups** that are **considered** to be at **high risk** of committing crime--working-class black and Latino young men and women in particular. Conservative criminologists suggested that the U.S. would need to increase its prison population dramatically to make crime-ridden cities safe (Zimring and Hawkins, 1991: 89-115). Sentencing models like three-strikes-and-you' re-out and mandatory minimum sentences were premised on the idea that the criminal justice systemshould [incapacitate](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/incapacitate) "career criminals," taking them off the streets before they committed a([nother](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Nother)) crime. Second, new generation of prisons was designed to offer a harsh environment that would act as a deterrent to those considering "a life of crime." Prisons providing educational programs, recreation activities, a decent diet, and adequate healthcare were considered to be "hotels" that did little to scare the inmate straight. Instead, the new prisons were to be austere environments with "no frills." Sheriff Jo Arpaio's Maricopa county jail, where inmates are kept in tents in the 110-degree Arizona desert heat and made to work on chain gangs, is the ultimate "no frills" jail. New generation prisons mirrored this philosophy with austere concrete, steel, and glass environments designed to facilitate control and surveillance rather than meaningful activity or social interaction.   
Third, these new prisons should cost as little as possible to [incarcerate](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/incarcerate) the maximum number of prisoners possible. Thus, savings were made in the design of prisons, with embedded technology such as video surveillance that permitted reduction in staffing ratios. This appearance of cost efficiency served to mask the real cost to the public of punitive penal policies, enabling legislators who otherwise favored low taxes and small government to appear fiscally responsible while spending millions of dollars to incarcerate nonviolent offenders and drug addicts.The **construction of** two 4,000-bed **prisons in Iraq is an indication that the** Bush **administration plans to remake the country's criminal justice system in the image of the U.S. gulag**, using incapacitation and deterrence to enforce compliance by a devastated and insurgent population. **Given the role of U.S. prisons in warehousing disenfranchised populations** and generating corporate profits, it should come as little surprise that the U.S. quasi-colonial administration would need **superjails** as an integral part of the new "open for business" Iraq. Prison construction **and** the construction and **management of "crime" are thus central to U.S. militarism and empire building.**

**Offense/defense** paradigm is good. Neg burden is to prove that a competitive post-fiat policy option is better than the aff. Two reasons:

**First**, this interp is most fair because it gives reciprocal burdens to both sides instead of allowing the neg to moot the AC by questioning one of its infinite assumptions, giving the neg a no-risk, insufficient burden which the aff can’t weigh against or win offense on.

**Second**, this interp is most educational because it deals with how philosophy is actually applied to the real world, i.e. as a guide for action instead of a pointless thought experiment.

Therefore, affirming the topic is equivalent to endorsing it as an advocacy.

Finally, the neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

Engaging the state is key. Interrogating status quo prison policies is key to break down the prison industrial complex.

**Rodriguez 07**[[13]](#footnote-13)

To consider the U.S. prison as a global practice of dominance, we might begin with the now-indelible photo exhibition of captive brown men manipulated, expired, and rendered bare in the tombs of the U.S.-commandeered Abu Ghraib prison: here, I am concerned less with the idiosyncrasies of the carceral spectacle (who did what, administrative responsibilities, tedium of military corruption and incompetence, etc.) than I am with its inscription of the where in which the worst of U.S. prison/state violence incurs. **As the bodies of tortured prisoners in** this somewhere else, that is, beyond and outside the formal national domain of the United States, have become the hyper-visible and accessible raw material for a global critique of the U.S. state—with **Abu Ghraib** often **serv[e]**ing **as the signifier for** a generalized mobilization of **sentiment against** the **American occupation—the intimate and** Kritika Kultura, Issue 9, November 2007 49 **proximate bodies of those** locally and intimately **imprisoned within** the localities of **the U**nited **S**tates constantly **threaten to disappear from the** political and **moral registers of** U.S. civil **society, its resident** U.S. Establishment **Left,** and perhaps most if not all elements of the global Establishment Left, which includes NGOs, political parties, and sectarian organizations. I contend in this essay that **a new theoretical framing is required to critically** address (and **correct**) **the artificial delineation of** the statecraft of **Abu Ghraib** prison, **and other U.S.** formed and/or mediated **carceral sites across the global landscape, as somehow unique** and exceptional **to places outside the U.S.** proper. In other words, **a genealogy** and social theory **of U.S. state violence specific to** the regime of the **prison needs to be** delicately **situated within** the ensemble of **institutional relations, political intercourse**s, **and historical conjunctures** that precede, produce, and sustain places like the Abu Ghraib prison, and can therefore only be adequately articulated as a genealogy and theory of the allegedly “domestic” U.S. prison regime’s “globality” (I will clarify my use of this concept in the next part of this introduction).

Policy proposals are key to challenging institutional racism.

**Margalit and Sunstein 1**[[14]](#footnote-14)

**The disadvantaged**, or at least those inclined to act within that group, would like the law to solve their free-rider problem. They **will** also **want the law to recognize the normative weight of their claim**, to reduce inequality to some degree, and to fuel the view that the inequality of the status quo, or the equality-denying practice to which they object, is a form of injustice. If the law carries moral authority, successful legal reform is liable to turn their struggle from a mere assertion of interest to a push for change that is perceived as just. Under the right conditions, legal support can increase the likelihood that the threat to upset existing arrangements will appear something other than a spiteful and irrational move against self-interest. **If the law is on their side, then their struggle will** likely **be ennobled: legal sanction can make their action appear not for personal gain but in order to vindicate principle.** Consider the frequent plea of Martin Luther King, Jr.: "All we are saying to America is, be true to what you said on paper." [41](http://muse.jhu.edu.shs-13.scarsdaleschools.k12.ny.us:2048/journals/philosophy_and_public_affairs/v030/30.4ullmann_margalit.html" \l "FOOT41) But what might law do? The most obvious possibility is to outlaw a practice that contributes to inequality, not only providing sanctions against those who engage in that practice, but also emboldening those who act against that practice. Consider **civil rights laws banning** private **discrimination in employment**. The effects of these laws **go** well **beyond** their (comparatively rare) **legal enforcement**, whether public or private**.** If promotions and transfers are not allowed to reflect racial discrimination, **people** are more likely to **object to discriminatory practices, merely because of the legal prohibition.**[42](http://muse.jhu.edu.shs-13.scarsdaleschools.k12.ny.us:2048/journals/philosophy_and_public_affairs/v030/30.4ullmann_margalit.html" \l "FOOT42) These objections in turn have effects on behavior. By publicly advertising and affirming the rightness of the new convention, the law can increase the perception that an existing practice is unjust, add momentum to private indignation, and provide a focal point around which players can rally and affirm their commitment to change.

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12. “A world without prisons: resisting militarism, globalized punishment, and empire,” JULIA SUDBURY (e-mail: jsudbury@mills.edu) is a Canada Research Council Chair in Social Justice, Equity and Diversity in social work at the University of Toronto. She is the author of Other Kinds of Dreams: Black Women's Organisations and the Politics of Transformation (Routledge, 1998) and editor of Global Lockdown: Race, Gender and the Prison-Industrial Complex (Routledge, forthcoming). She is a founding member of Critical Resistance, a U.S. based organization that seeks to abolish prisons, a board member of Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, and a member of the Social Justice Editorial Board. COPYRIGHT 2004 Crime and Social Justice Associates [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
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